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I. INTRODUCTION
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1. Mark Obbie, Oklahoma Struggles with Its Tough-on-Crime Past, TAKEPART MAG., (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://www.takepart.com/feature/2016/09/19/violence-and-redemption-oklahoma.
2. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON POL¶Y
INITIATIVE, at fig.1 (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html.
3. State Question No. 780, Initiative Petition No. 404 (as proposed by Okla. Sec¶y of State, Jan. 27, 2016),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/780.pdf [hereinafter SQ780]; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1±71.3.
4. SQ780, supra note 3.
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2(A)(4).
6. The author requested statewide drug court admissions information from 2010 through 2018 from the
Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services via a Freedom of Information Request
(also called an Open Records Request in Oklahoma). E-mail from Jeffrey Dismukes, Dir. of Commc¶ns, Okla.
Dep¶t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., to the author (Jan. 25, 2019, 4:43PM CST) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Admissions Data].
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Voters in Oklahoma are driving ambitious and unprecedented criminal justice
UHIRUPZKLFKLVLQWHUHVWLQJEHFDXVH2NODKRPDKDVORQJEHHQDVWDOZDUWRIWKH³7RXJKRQ
&ULPH´HUD1 ³7RXJKRQ&ULPH´SROLFLHVLQFOXGHPDQGDWRU\PLQLPXPVIRUGUXJRIIHQVHV
and sentence enhancements for defendants with criminal histories. Oklahoma enacted both
W\SHVRISROLFLHV IURPWKH HDUO\¶VXQWLO7KHVHSROLFLHVOHGWRDERRPLQWKH
prison population that has had catastrophic effects, including an unmanageable prison
population and longer prison sentences than any other state in the US.2
:KLOH LW LV LPSHUDWLYH IRU YRWHUV¶ YRLFHV WR EH KHDUG DOWHULQJ ORQJVWDQGLQJ OHJDO
systems through state ballot questions has caused inconsistencies in the law that could
have dramatic effects. In one example, Oklahoma State Questions 780 and 781 (hereinafter
SQ780 and SQ781)²passed in 2016²created inconsistencies in applying the current state
drug court statute.3 SQ780 reclassified the crime of drug possession from a felony to a
misdemeanor, yet the current drug court statute requires a felony conviction for admission
to drug court. This Comment lays out the background history that led to the passage of
SQ780 and SQ781 in Part II.
These criminal justice reform initiatives²intended to lower prison populations²
reduced the classifications of many low-level felonies, including drug possession, and
diverted funds to evidence-based addiction treatments. Specifically, SQ780 declassified
all low-level drug possession charges from felonies to misdemeanors with a maximum
punishment of one year in jail and/or a one thousand dollar fine. 4 SQ781 was dependent
on the passage of SQ780²this measure required funds saved from incarcerating nonviolent felons to be redistributed into county drug addiction treatment and prevention
programs. However, the Oklahoma drug court statute requires a felony charge before a
defendant is eligible for admission to an alternative sentencing drug court.5
Since the middle of 2017, when SQ780 went into effect, county drug court
admissions have dropped by eighteen percent compared to previous years. 6 See Figure 1
below.
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7. 35 OKLA. REG. 1349 (2018).
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Herein lies the conundrum: If interpreted plainly, the contrast between SQ780 and
the Oklahoma drug court statute could cause county drug courts across the state to lose
their funding, since funding is allocated to each program based on participation. If there
are not enough people in the programs, the programs will eventually become financially
unsustainable. It is too soon to tell how impactful the funds being redirected into
alternative treatments via SQ781 will be in ameliorating this issue. Most likely, those funds
will not be used to support compulsory county drug courts, but other types of drug abuse
prevention programs. However, Oklahoma Management and Enterprise Services (OMES)
has specified that any funding requests for money from the SQ781 fund must flow through
district attorneys¶ offices,7 so it is possible that SQ781 money could supplement the
funding lost from county drug courts, and this Comment cannot discount that possible
outcome. In the vacuum created by such sweeping criminal justice reforms, uncertainty is
rampant. In the face of such uncertainty, it is important to examine alternative statutory
interpretations that can remedy this possible funding shortage.
In Part III, the Comment examines and applies three models of ballot initiative
interpretation. When looking at these models and the canons of statutory interpretation,
the analysis concludes there are three ways to interpret the Drug Court/SQ780 discrepancy:
(1) the State Questions and the drug court statute may remain as written, but result in a
dramatically smaller number of eligible drug court defendants; (2) SQ780 and SQ781
implicitly repeal the drug court statute; or (3) the drug court statute is no longer functional
DVZULWWHQDQGPXVWEHDPHQGHGWRUHIOHFWWKHYRWHUV¶LQWHQWRIUHGXFLQJVWDWHVSHQGLQJRQ
prisons and reducing incarceration.
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Part IV lists recommendations for statutory amendments to the drug court statute,
because amending the statute is the best available outcome. If the drug court statute and
the State Questions remain un-UHFRQFLOHG YRWHUV¶ YRLFHV DUH HVVHQWLDOO\ UHQGHUHG
meanLQJOHVVZKLOHFRXQW\GUXJFRXUWSURJUDPVFRQWLQXHWKH³EXVLQHVVDVXVXDO´RISODFLQJ
increasingly smaller numbers of eligible defendants into the programs with little disruption
to practitioners. This can go on until the overhead of the programs exceeds operating funds
driven by defendant participation, at which point the drug court programs will no longer
make financial sense. This also leaves drug court programs vulnerable to the whims of
policy makers and elected leaders who can eliminate the programs with little fanfare by
following the plain text of the statutes. Conversely, if the state questions implicitly repeal
the drug court statute, very little structure exists to implement an entirely new scheme of
treatment and treatment funding across the state being diverted by SQ781, and no
compulsory court-ordered compliance to utilize such programs currently exists. In ballot
LQLWLDWLYHVWKHYRWHULVWKHODZPDNHUWKXVWKH YRWHU¶VLQWHQWVKRXOGEHLQIXVHGLQWRDQ\
current laws that contradict the state questions. Under this view, lawmakers must amend
the drug court statute to reflect the will of the voters and create a statute that rehabilitates
DGGLFWVDQGUHGXFHV2NODKRPD¶VLQFDUFHUDWLRQHSLGHPLF+RZ2NODKRPDOHDGHUVFKRRVH
to reconcile these laws will have longstanding effects on the treatment and adjudication of
addict populations across the state.
II. OKLAHOMA¶S CRIMINAL JUSTICE HISTORY FORCED VOTERS TO TAKE MATTERS INTO
THEIR OWN HANDS
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05/15/2020 10:30:18

8. Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 2.
9. See Linda G. Morrissey & Vicki S. Brandt, Community Sentencing in Oklahoma: Offenders Get a Second
Chance to Make a First Impression, 36 TULSA L. REV. 767, 768±72 (2001).
10. Id. at 770.
11. Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1462±63 nn.105±08,
1517±19 nn.310±13 (2000); Eric L. Sevigny, Brian K. Fuleihan & Frank V. Ferdik, Do Drug Courts Reduce the
Use of Incarceration?: A Meta-Analysis, 41 J. CRIM. JUST. 416, 423 (2013).
12. MICHAEL W. FINIGAN, SHANNON M. CAREY & ANTON COX, IMPACT OF A MATURE DRUG COURT OVER
10
YEARS
OF
OPERATION:
RECIDIVISM
AND
COSTS
(Apr.
2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219225.pdf.
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In 2016, when SQ780 and 781 were passed, Oklahoma had the highest incarceration
rate in the world.8 SQ780 and SQ781 were passed after forty years of prison growth that
the legislature repeatedly failed to address.9 Although community sentencing legislation
passed in 1999 was intended to address this high incarceration rate, compromises to that
legislation added to continued prison population growth. 10 County drug courts can drive
incarceration due to variant practice standards and high revocation rates, 11 but they remain
a stalwart for treating addicts in the criminal justice system.12 SQ780 and SQ781
declassified simple drug possession and low-level property crimes from felonies to
misdemeanors in order to reverse the trend in prison population growth. While they may
reduce admissions into prison, the changes do QRWUHFRQFLOH ZLWKWKHVWDWH¶VGUXJFRXUW
statute that requires a felony for admission.
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A. In 1999, Oklahoma’s Community Sentencing Law Was Passed to Address Swelling
Prison Populations
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13. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY: DRUG ARRESTS AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES,
12 (2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0309web_1.pdf.
14. LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY,
POLICY, AND TRENDS 5 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43749.pdf.
15. Id.
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401 (1971). This statute is the drug possession statute. It first went into effect in
1971. Most states codified large drug possession and distribution statutes with hefty penalties (known as
Rockefeller drug laws) in response to public outcry about addiction and distribution of drugs. Criminal law
experts pinpoint this moment as the beginning of an incarceration epidemic in the United States. Brian Mann,
The
Drug
Laws
That
Changed
How
We
Punish,
NPR
(Feb.
14,
2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish.
17. § 2-401.
18. § 2-415 (2018); § 51.1 (2018).
19. SQ780, supra note 3.
20. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 768±71.
21. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, 26 CRIME & JUST.
17, 18±19 (1999).
22. John Greiner & Mick Hinton, Lawmakers Rewrite Truth in Sentencing, OKLAHOMAN (July 1, 1999),
https://newsok.com/article/2658928/lawmakers-rewrite-truth-in-sentencing.
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&KDQJHVWRFULPLQDOODZLQWKH¶VEHJDQZLWKDPHQGPHQWVWR federal statutes
that introduced mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes and sentence
enhancements for repeat offenders.13 $W3UHVLGHQW1L[RQ¶VEHKHVWODZHQIRUFHPHQWEHJDQ
EDWWOLQJDKLVWRULFLQFUHDVHLQGUXJXVHLQ$PHULFD¶VPDMRUFLWLHVSDUWLFXODUOy heroin.14 As
these changes to sentencing became law in federal courts, states followed suit. States
across the nation began to amend criminal statutes to increase sentencing for drug-related
crimes.15
Oklahoma was among the states that enacted highly punitive, long sentences for drug
crimes beginning in the early 1970s.16 For example, until SQ780 was passed in 2016,
Possession with Intent to Distribute Illegal Drugs was punishable by a range of zero years
to life in prison.17 Drug Trafficking currently carries a sentence of ten years to life as well
as a $50,000 fine that can apply to each count. 18 SQ780 implemented changes to the law
WKDWKDGSUHYLRXVO\UHVXOWHGLQ2NODKRPD¶VSULVRQSRSXODWLRQTXDGUXSOLQJRYHUWKHV
and 1990s.19 By the late 1990s, legislators realized they needed to curb prison growth, and
a three-year legislative battle on this topic began in 1997. More liberal legislators²who
called for community sentencing and more flexible parole parameters²clashed with more
conservative legislators²who EHOLHYHG WKDW 2NODKRPD¶V VWUHHWV ZHUH VDIHU GXH WR WKH
strong punishment and sentencing statutes in place.20
Legislators and criminal law experts correctly foresaw prison growth as a drain on
resources and revenue for the state budget. 21 By 1999, the prison population was
unmanageable: the cost of maintaining prisons was mounting while revenue from a lowtaxed base was waning. Legislators needed to find a way to implement measures that
would curb prison growth, but still play to a largely conservative base. In addition, they
QHHGHGWRDSSHDVHGLVWULFWDWWRUQH\VZKRIHDUHGFRPPXQLW\VHQWHQFLQJZRXOGEHWRR³VRIW
RQFULPH´22
$PLGFDOOVIURPWKHSXEOLFDQGGLVWULFWDWWRUQH\VWRPDLQWDLQWKH³WRXJKRQFULPH´
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sentencing laws, the Oklahoma Legislature passed a criminal justice reform bill with three
goals. First was community sentencing²WKHSUDFWLFHRI³SURWHFW[ing] the public in a costeffective . . . system that utilizes a broad spectrum of supervised sanctions to treat both the
criminogenic and social needs of the eligible offender while they remain in the
FRPPXQLW\´23 Across the state, courts were faced with a lack of options between the
extremes of prison time and probation.24 Community sentencing provided a bridge
between the two extremes that allowed defendants a second chance to rehabilitate from
drug addiction. Second, the law required defendants FRQYLFWHG RI WKH ³(OHYHQ 'HDGO\
6LQV´25 to serve the first eighty-five percent of their prison sentences with no ability to
earn additional days off their sentences²put plainly, eighty-five percent of the sentence
was to be served as hard time.26 Crimes in this category eventually became known as
³HLJKW\-ILYHSHUFHQWFULPHV´27 7KLVSDUWRIWKHODZZDVDFRPSURPLVHIRUWKH³WRXJKRQ
FULPH´SURSRQHQWVEXW ZRXOGXOWLPDWHO\ be a fatal flaw that would continue to overfill
prisons for the next nineteen years.28 Third, the law enforced a prison capacity cap stating
that when prisons were at ninety-five percent capacity, inmates with eligible time credits
were provided early release.29
The Oklahoma Community Sentencing Act of 1999 authorized ten pilot programs
for community sentencing and also passed the drug court statute. 30 This portion of the bill
created drug courts in ten counties: Tulsa, Grady, Wagoner, Cherokee, Pontotoc, Hughes,
Seminole, Rogers, Mayes, and Craig.31 The drug court statute outlines how drug courts
VKRXOGEHFRQGXFWHGWKHSDUDPHWHUVWKDWPXVWEHDSSOLHGWRWKHGHIHQGDQWV¶FKDUJHVDQG

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

Persons convicted of: [f]irst degree murder as defined in Section 701.9 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma
Statutes]; . . . [r]obbery with a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 801 of [Title 21 of the
Oklahoma Statutes]; . . . [f]irst degree rape as provided in Section . . . 1115 of [Title 21 of the
Oklahoma Statutes]; . . . [f]irst degree arson as defined in Section 1401 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma
Statutes]; . . . [f]irst degree burglary as provided in Section 1436 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma
Statutes]; . . . [b]ombing as defined in Section 1767.1 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [a]ny
crime against a child provided for in Section 843.5 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [f]orcible
sodomy as defined in Section 888 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [c]hild pornography as
defined in Section 1021.2 or 1021.3 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [c]hild prostitution as
defined in Section 1030 of [Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes]; [l]ewd molestation of a child as
defined in Section 1123 of [the Oklahoma Statues] . . . shall be required to serve not less than eightyfive percent (85%) of any sentence of imprisonment imposed by the judicial system prior to becoming
eligible for consideration for parole. Persons convicted of these offenses shall not be eligible for
earned credits or any other type of credits which have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence
to less than eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 13.1 (1999).
28. Ryan Gentzler, What’s Driving Oklahoma’s Prison Population Growth?, OKLA. POL¶Y INST. (Feb. 9,
2016), https://okpolicy.org/whats-driving-prison-population-growth/.
29. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 770.
30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1±471.3 (2014).
31. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 771.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 93 Side B

23. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 767.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 763.
26. Oklahoma Community Sentencing Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 988.1±88.23 (Supp. 2000); ³Hard time´
refers to time that inmates are serving day for day, as opposed to time that can earn them credits for time served
and potentially lead to early release.
27. For example, an exceprt of the statute reads:
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32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1±71.3 (2014).
33. § 471.1(c) (1997).
34. § 471.2 (1997).
35. 1 NAT¶L ASSOC. OF DRUG COURT PROF¶LS, ADULT DRUG COURT BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS 5 (2013),
https://www.nadcp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Adult-Drug-Court-Best-Practice-Standards-Volume-IText-Revision-December-2018-1.pdf.
36. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 774±80.
37. For the purposes of this note, the analysis focuses on county drug courts, permitted by OKLA. STAT. tit.
22, §§ 471.1±71.3 (2014), and thus largely does not discuss mental health courts, domestic violence courts, or
privately funded alternative sentencing options.
38. Women in Recovery is a women¶s diversionary program that is privately funded by Family and Children¶s
Services in Tulsa. It is a trauma-informed addiction treatment and job readiness program. Women in Recovery,
FAMILY & CHILDREN¶S SERV¶S. OF OKLA., https://www.fcsok.org/services/women-in-recovery/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2018). First Step is a Tulsa County men¶s diversionary program funded by grants and headed by former
criminal judge, William Kellough. FIRST STEP MALE DIVERSION PROGRAM, http://1ststepmdp.com/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2018) .

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 94 Side A

several restrictions that limit eligibility of defendants. 32 The law was intended to provide
non-violent drug offenders an alternative that was more invasive than parole and less
detrimental than prison.
The drug court statute, a piece of the Community Sentencing Act, was written not
only to preclude any offender who had committed an eighty-five percent crime, but went
a step further and screened out several more violent offenses that were not classified as
eighty-five percent crimes at the time. 33 The district attorney could waive this restriction
on admissibility, as long as the crime was not an eighty-five percent crime. The statute
then required that the offender be assessed using a screening process to determine his/her
probability of reoffending and overall criminality risk to the community. The assessment
LV XVHG WR GHWHUPLQH WKH RIIHQGHU¶V FXVWRPL]HG SODQ DQG DFWLRQ VWHSV 34 The ideal
criminality score for a drug court participant is moderate²research showed that those
lower on the scale were likely to see an increase in criminality score if entered into the
program. Those higher on the scale needed a stronger intervention like prison. 35
The Community Sentencing Act requires offenders to plead guilty, be found guilty,
or enter a nolo contendere plea in order to access an alternative community sentencing
option. The Act gives the court discretion over which rehabilitative resources the offender
may access. These resources largely depend on the area where the court is located²urban
or rural. Once in a community-sentencing program, forty to seventy percent of the
RIIHQGHU¶V WLPH LV RFFXSLHG E\ FRPSO\LQJ ZLWK SURJUDP JXLGHOLQHV 7KHVH FDQ LQFOXGH
meetings, drug tests, job training, therapy, or in-patient treatment. If an offender does not
comply with the program guidelines, there is a wide range of sanctions available to the
court including fines, reduction in program levels (effectively extending the time in the
program), and jail time. If the offender completes the sentencing program successfully,
their conviction is discharged or dismissed with prejudice. 36
Over the next eighteen years, community sentencing took root in Oklahoma and
became a large part of how the criminal justice system treats addiction, mental health, and
domestic violence.37 Tulsa County, for example, has mental health court, a domestic
violence court, and a drug court in addition to a few privately-funded alternative
sentencing programs.38 However, some rural counties may only offer drug court as an
alternative to incarceration and some may have a mix of the above alternative courts. Since
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1999, drug courts have spread from the ten pilot programs to seventy-three of the seventyseven counties across Oklahoma. The drug court statute, a subset of the Community
Sentencing Act, has been amended three times, once in 2008 to add misdemeanor drug
courts, again in 2009 to allow for juvenile drug court programs, and finally in 2016 to
allow for a new form of mental health and substance abuse evaluation.39
B. Despite the Imposition of Community Sentencing, by 2016 Oklahoma Ranked Number
One in the World for Incarceration
Even after eighteen years of community sentencing, Oklahoma still struggles with
over-capacity prisons and the voters have yet to see meaningful legislative action to reduce
prison populations. Though they were intentionally limited to only eleven crimes at their
inception, the eighty-five percent crimes have grown to twenty-two total crimes as part of
an effort to increase punitive measures toward violent criminals. 40 This has led to an
overpopulated prison system that will take years to correct.
In 2016, Oklahoma also topped the list of states for number of incarcerated
women.41 Per capita, there were more females serving prison time in Oklahoma than in
any other state. This statistic is startling because of research that shows the impact
incarcerating women has on families and communities as a whole. Incarcerating a parent
leaves their children three times more likely to become criminal-justice-involved in their
lifetime.42 Further, Oklahoma incarcerated more citizens per capita than Cuba, China, and
Russia.43 Oklahoma was also number one for overall incarceration or criminal justice
supervision, with over 36,900 individuals incarcerated and 28,000 on probation.44
Oklahoma incarcerated 1,079 individuals per 100,000 citizens, overtaking Louisiana
which previously held the number-one seat in incarceration at 1,057 per 100,000.45

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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39. Oklahoma Drug Court Act, Laws 1997, SB 645, c. 359, § 2 (Amended by Laws 2008, HB 2522, c. 37, §
1, eff. November 1, 2008; Amended by Laws 2009, HB 2029, c. 234, § 131, emerg. eff. May 21, 2009; Amended
by Laws 2016, HB 2753, c. 222, § 1, eff. November 1, 2016).
40. Today¶s eighty-five percent crimes in Oklahoma include: First degree murder as defined in OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 701.7; Second degree murder as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.8; Manslaughter in the first
degree as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 711; Poisoning with intent to kill as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 651; Shooting with intent to kill, as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 652; Assault with intent to kill as
provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 653; Conjoint robbery as defined by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 800; Robbery
with a dangerous weapon as defined in Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 801; First degree robbery as defined in OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 797; First degree rape as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1111, 1114, 1115; First degree arson
as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1401; First degree burglary as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1436;
Bombing as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1767.1; Any crime against a child provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 843.5; Forcible sodomy as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 888; Child pornography or aggravated child
pornography as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1021.2, 1021.3, 1024.1, 1024.2, 1040.12a; Child prostitution
as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1030; Lewd molestation of a child as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1123;
Abuse of a vulnerable adult, as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 10-103; Aggravated trafficking as provided
for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-41(C); and Human trafficking as provided for in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748.
41. Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 2, at fig.1.
42. JAMES M. CONWAY & EDWARD T. JONES, SEVEN OUT OF TEN? NOT EVEN CLOSE: REVIEW OF RESEARCH
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS BECOMING JUSTICE-INVOLVED, INST. FOR
MUN.
&
REG¶L
POL¶Y
AT
CENT.
CONN.
ST.
U.
5
(2015),
https://www.ccsu.edu/imrp/Publicatons/Files/CIP_Seven_Out_of_Ten_Not_Even_Close.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 2, at fig.1.
45. SQ780, supra note 3.
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46. LA. DEP¶T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRS. & LA. COMM¶N ON L. ENF¶T, LOUISIANA¶S JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT
REFORMS
FIRST
ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE
REPORT
24
(June
2018),
http://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/JRI/LA_JRI_Annual_Report_FINAL.PDF.
47. OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM & FWD.US, OKLAHOMA¶S ONGOING IMPRISONMENT
CRISIS (2018), https://www.fwd.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/oklahoma_data_update_2018.pdf.
48. Jake Horowitz & Elizabeth Compa, Louisiana Continues Efforts to Protect Public Safety and Reform
Justice
System,
PEW
(Nov.
19,
2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2019/11/19/louisiana-continues-efforts-to-protect-public-safety-and-reform-justice-system.
49. Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 783 (2008).
50. Id.
51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2 (A)(1)±(3) (2018).
52. Quinton Chandler, Prosecutors and Court Officials Disagree on Reason for Downturn in Drug Court
Participation, ST. IMPACT OKLA. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2019/01/10/prosecutorsand-court-officials-disagree-on-reason-for-downturn-in-drug-court-participation/.
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 471.2(A)(2).
54. Often defendants face numerous counts, some of which could be felonies and others of which could be
misdemeanors. If the charge with the longest potential sentence is considered violent by Oklahoma statute, it is
the controlling charge.
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 471.2.
56. See sources cited supra note 40.
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In contrast to Oklahoma, Louisiana has undertaken meaningful criminal justice
reform. In 2017, Louisiana passed the Justice Reinvestment Initiative. The bill focused on
reducing the number of non-violent criminals in prison, strengthening community
supervision and reinvesting savings into recidivism reduction and crime victim support.
Since its passage, Louisiana reports a twenty-one percent reduction in drug offenders
entering prison, and a twenty percent decrease in property crime offenders. 46 Unlike
/RXLVLDQD2NODKRPD¶VUHIRUPHIIRUWV(until 2016) have done little to impact the overall
number of incarcerated individuals. In fact, after SQ780 and SQ781 went into effect,
prison admissions rose.47 This is surprising because SQ780 and SQ781 are modeled off
of progressive and effective criminal justice reforms, like those taking place in Louisiana.
As of the date of publication, Louisiana has returned to the number one incarcerator in the
world, however the state has experienced a downturn in prison admissions since
implementing reforms.48
One driver of incarceration in Oklahoma is the misuse of drug courts. Many
defendants who plea into drug court are contra-indicated²their addiction behaviors and
criminality indicators are not a fit with an alternative sentencing drug court. 49 ContraindiFDWLRQ PRVW RIWHQ OHDGV WR D UHYRFDWLRQ RI D GHIHQGDQW¶V GUXJ FRXUW SOHD GXH WR
continued drug use or other infractions. In the end, after failing drug court, many of these
defendants get longer prison sentences than a jury would have handed down at trial.50
Further, the current drug court statute contains many restrictions precluding good
candidates from admission into drug court programs. 51 The current drug court statute
requires that the district attorney offer defendants drug court. Ultimately this restriction
leads the district attorney WRPDNHPRUDOLVWLFGHFLVLRQVDERXWZKR³GHVHUYHV´GUXJFRXUW
even when the court-administered drug and alcohol assessment indicates a defendant may
be a good fit.52 In addition, any prior violent felony within the past ten years precludes a
defendant from drug court.53 All violent felonies as controlling charges54 are precluded
except domestic violence offenders who can be pled into statutory domestic violence
courts.55 2NODKRPDKDVDEURDGGHILQLWLRQRI³YLROHQW´ 56 and this restriction is keeping
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defendants out of drug court whose violent tendencies are a reflection of their addiction.
Those defendants are not given the option to avoid prison, thus contributing to the growth
RI2NODKRPD¶VSULVRQSRSXODWLRQ
III. INTERPRETING OKLAHOMA¶S DRUG COURT STATUTE IN LIGHT OF SQ780
Statutory interpretation requires divining the intent of the lawmaker, but when
interpreting ballot initiatives, the lawmaker is the voter. 57 Determining voter intent has
long vexed courts and scholars.58 This section provides an overview of three scholarly
theories for interpreting ballot initiatives, which yield three potential statutory
interpretations for the inconsistency created by SQ780: (1) SQ780 and the drug court
statute can coexist but the number of eligible defendants will continue to shrink, (2) SQ780
implicitly repeals the drug court statute, and (3) the drug court statute must be amended to
UHIOHFWWKHYRWHUV¶LQWHQWWRUHGXFHWKHUDWHRILQFDUFHUDWLRQ
A. Courts and the Legislature Must Interpret the Voters’ Intent When Reading SQ780
and Its Interplay with Other Statutes
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Y K
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57. Stephen H. Sutro, Interpretation of Initiatives by Similar Statutes: Canons of Construction Do Not
Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945, 946 (1994).
58. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105
YALE L.J. 107, 127 (1995).
59. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 247
(2012).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 180.
62. Sutro, supra note 57, at 945.
63. Id. at 946.
64. Schacter, supra note 58 at 117.
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Typically, courts and legislators must employ many different methods, or canons, in
order to interpret statutes.59 &DQRQVLQFOXGHEHGURFNSULQFLSOHVVXFKDV³$VWDWXWHVKRXOG
be iQWHUSUHWHG LQ D ZD\ WKDW DYRLGV SODFLQJ LWV FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ LQ GRXEW´ 60 Another
IUHTXHQWO\FLWHGSULQFLSOHLV³7KHSURYLVLRQVRIDWH[WVKRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQDZD\WKDW
UHQGHUVWKHPFRPSDWLEOHQRWFRQWUDGLFWRU\´ 61 Yet, these canons of statutory construction
offer little support in determining whether the Oklahoma Drug Court statute or SQ780
governs because the laws are not directly adverse to each other, and voters rather than
legislators enacted SQ780. Each of these canons are intended to interpret statutes, not
ballot initiatives. Legislators and legislative counsels, who have had legal or legislative
training, write statutes. These canons do not necessarily apply to ballot initiatives, which
are drafted by small special interest groups and passed into law by voters²lay people who
often hold no understanding of how laws fit together. 62
Since the lawmakers¶ intent is what drives statutory interpretation, the voter
becomes the lawmaker when interpreting ballot initiatives.63 In a study examining fiftythree cases where judges interpreted ballot initiatives, the majority of judges stated that
³WKHLUWDVN>ZDV@WRORFDWHWKHFRQWUROOLQJSRSXODULQWHQW´EHKLQGWKHEDOORWLQLWLDWLYH 64 In
general, ballot initiatives are disfavored among courts and legislators because the intent is
difficult to discern. The public is often under- or misinformed, and ballot initiatives can
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create inconsistencies in the law.65 To remedy the issue created by SQ780, it is helpful to
understand the three prominent models of scholarship that have analyzed methods for
interpreting ballot initiatives: the Schacter Model, the Frickey Model, and the Gilbert
Model.
B. Applying the Schacter Model of Ballot Initiative Interpretation66
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65. Id. at 127.
66. Id.
67. Michael D. Gilbert, Interpreting Initiatives, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1621, 1629 (2013) (stating WKDW6FKDFWHU¶V
model only applies when initiative petitions are long, confusing, full of jargon, and potentially harmful to
marginalized groups).
68. Schacter, supra note 58, at 109.
69. Id. at 155.
70. Id. at 156.
71. Id. at 109 n.5.
72. Id. at 160.
73. Considering the time in which Schacter was writing²a time of ³Tough on Crime´ rhetoric when
California aired strongly worded television commercials attempting to pass criminal law amendments via voter
initiatives²this warning is contextualized. Schacter, supra note 58, at 158.
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In 1995, Jane Schacter, a statutory interpretation scholar at Yale, was one of the first
scholars to tackle the statutory interpretation of modern ballot initiatives. Her model is
only narrowly applicable.67 6FKDFWHU¶V PRGHO WDNHV WZR WKLQJV DV JRVSHO   WKDW VWDWH
ballot initiatives are highly likely to create issues of federal constitutionality and (2) that
these same ballot initiatives lend themselves to extensive problems with statutory
interpretation. Since Schacter is a recognized authority in statutory interpretation, she
focuses her analysis on interpreting ballot initiatives and reconciling them with current
laws.68
Schacter urges courts to apply a specialized set of statutory interpretation guidelines
specifically for ballot initiatives. She believes part of the problem with ballot initiatives is
the lack of deliberation, which would allow the public to see both sides of any given
initiative clearly. Additionally, lack of deliberation robs courts of information, which
could be integral to determining the meaning of an ambiguous term in a ballot initiative.69
6FKDFWHU¶V proposed solution asks courts to initiate interpretive litigation when there is a
challenge to a ballot initiative, allowing applications for intervention and amicus curiae
participation by interested and potentially unorganized parties. Interpretive litigation
happens most often when a ballot initiative is passed, but opposition groups gather enough
signatures on a petition to get an injunction against the initiative. A court intervening at
the injunctive phase allows it to ferret out interpretive issues with the measure. Interpretive
litigation allows the court to see potential problematic language and other issues that
lawyers could bring forward should the initiative become law and later be litigated. 70
Another issue Schacter highlights is the potential for abuse of the ballot initiative
process by special interest groups who can play on the biases of the populous to create
problematic and discriminatory laws.71 Schacter advocates for a narrow construction to be
DSSOLHG WR DOO LQLWLDWLYH ODZV GXH WR WKH ³V\VWHPLF SUREOHPV LQ WKH GLUHFW ODZPDNLQJ
SURFHVV´72 She warns against ambiguous language, stating that many ballot initiatives are
coded with racial language and can have disproportionate impacts on minorities. 73
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74. ³Colorado voters adopted by statewide referendum µAmendment 2¶ to the State Constitution, which
precludes all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect
the status of persons based on their µhomosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.¶´ Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996).
75. Id. at 635±36.
76. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
77. Just
the
Facts:
Proposition
8,
PUB. POL¶Y INST. OF CAL. (Dec.
2008),
https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_Prop8JTF.pdf.
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1±71.3 (2014).
79. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401 (1999).
80. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471.1±71.3 (2014) and SQ 780, supra at note 3, to infer
incompatibility.
81. Schacter, supra note 58, at 158±59.
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Schacter instructs courts to interpret language that implicitly targets socially marginalized
groups extremely narrowly, if at all. For example, &RORUDGR¶V voters passed a
GLVFULPLQDWRU\EDOORWLQLWLDWLYHLQFDOOHG³Amendment 2´74 The measure sought to
repeal all gay rights ordinances in Colorado and also prevented the state from passing new
gay rights ordinances. The measure passed with 53.2% of the vote but was later struck
down by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans.75 6FKDFWHU¶VPRGHOZRXOGKDYHLQVWUXFWHG
courts to essentially ignore Amendment 2 because of its discriminatory intent and its
violation of the equal protection clause. 76
Schacter proposes the following tests for ballot initiative interpretation: First, allow
WKH EDOORW LQLWLDWLYH WR EH ³EHWD WHVWHG´ E\ LQWHUSUHWLYH OLWLJDWLRQ. Second, interpret any
language that is intended to negatively impact historically disadvantaged groups and
protected classes extremely narrowly, if the court feels it should be given any weight at
all. Intentionally discriminatory ballot measures²VXFK DV &DOLIRUQLD¶V 3URSRVLWLRQ ²
would likely be federally unconstitutional, so 6FKDFWHU¶V tests apply to those initiatives that
are deemed constitutional.77
6FKDFWHU¶V PRGHO KDV QDUURZ DSSOLFability because few voter initiatives would be
ruled constitutional that contain the intentionally discriminatory language she cautions
against. However, if WKLVGRHVRFFXU6FKDFWHU¶VWKHRU\ZRXOGEHWKHEHVWWRDSSO\ZKHQ
interpreting those measures.
SchDFWHU¶V PRGHO ZKLOH JURXQGEUHDNLQJ GRHV OLWWOH WR UHVROYH WKH LQFRQVLVWHQF\
between SQ780 and the drug court statute. SQ780 and OklaKRPD¶VGUXJFRXUWVWDWXWHDUH
indirectly in opposition with each other and require judicial interpretation. The two laws
do not reference each other and SQ780 makes no mention of repealing or amending the
drug court statute.78 However, there is a derivative impact on the drug court statute
because SQ780 amends the drug possession statute. The drug possession statute previously
outlined drug possession as a felony. 79 Therefore, when SQ780 declassified drug
possession to a misdemeanor, the impact had a derivative effect on the drug court statute. 80
6FKDFWHU ZRXOG KHVLWDWH WR DSSO\ 2NODKRPD¶V UXOHV RI VWDWXWRU\ FRQVWUXFWLRQ WR D
ballot initiative because her goal is largely to limit the interpretation of voter-driven law.
Since the issue here is that two laws stand in opposition²one voter-driven and one
legislature-driven²Schacter would urge courts to narrowly apply the ballot initiative to
pre-existing laws.81 However, Schacter focuses heavily on the idea that ballot initiatives
can hurt minorities who do not have money and access to special interest groups that draft
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state questions.
When looking at the intent behind SQ780, there is no evidence that the ballot
initiative will negatively impact minorities²in fact, the outcome is likely the opposite.
For instance, minorities are more likely to be negatively impacted by drug felonies, and
also more likely to be negatively affected by having a felony on their record.82 The
imprisonment rate for black individuals in Oklahoma is 2,625 per 100,000 as compared to
whites at 580 per 100,000 and Hispanics at 530 per 100,000.83 Thus, eliminating the felony
for drug possession will ultimately help minority defendants. In addition, the types of
amendments prescribed in SQ780 are not the type to invite litigation in the ways that
Schacter characterizes.84 Many of the ballot initiatives she references are related to civil
rights and, thus, vulnerable to litigation. Amending criminal statutes, as SQ780 does, is
not likely to invite civil rights litigation because criminal statutes are facially neutral.
6KRXOG D FLWL]HQ¶V FLYLO ULJKWV EH LQIULQJHG E\ WKH SROLFH ZKR ZHUH DUUHVWLQJ XQGHU D
criminal statute, those citizens would sue under civil rights laws, not the criminal statutes
themselves.85 )RU WKHVH UHDVRQV DSSO\LQJ 6FKDFWHU¶V WHVWV GRes little to resolve the
inconsistency created by SQ780.
C. Applying the Frickey Model of Ballot Initiative Interpretation86
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82. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 12.
83. State-by-State
Data:
Oklahoma,
THE
SENTENCING
PROJECT
(2017),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/#map (last visisted Nov. 1, 2018).
84. Most notable was California¶s Ballot Proposition 184, which passed in 1994. The so-called ³Three
Strikes´ law allowed repeat felony offenders to get life in prison after their third felony conviction, even if the
offenses were non-violent. This proposition drove a lot of due process litigation in the state. See generally Samuel
H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California’s Three Strikes Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483
(2002).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
86. Phillip Frickey, Interpretations on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons and Direct Democracy, 1996
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 478 (1996).
87. Id. at 521.
88. Id. at 522.
89. Liz Whyte, Corporations, Advocacy Groups Spend Big on Ballot Measures, TIME MAG. (Oct. 26, 2014),
http://time.com/3532419/ballot-measures-corporations/.
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Phillip P. Frickey was a constitutional and statutory interpretation scholar and
professor of law at the University of Minnesota Law School before moving to Berkeley
School of Law. Frickey believed that statutory interpretation of ballot initiatives should
KDYHWZRJRDOV³WRJLYHWKHHOHFWRUDWHWKHLUGXHDQGWRSURWHFWSXEOLFYDOXHV´ 87 Frickey
IHOW WKDW ZKHQ WKHUH ZDV D FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ DOORZLQJ YRWHUV¶ YRLFHV WR EH KHDUG DQG
SURWHFWLQJ SXEOLF YDOXHV WKHQ WKH LQLWLDWLYH¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ was called into question.
These types of initiatives are better left to litigation. However, when the issues surrounding
LQWHUSUHWLQJ D EDOORW LQLWLDWLYH GHDO ZLWK WKH ³DSSOLFDWLRQ RI DPELJXRXV ODQJXDJH WR
circumstances not clearly encompassed within the FRUH SXUSRVHV RI WKH PHDVXUH´ WKHQ
traditional canons of statutory interpretation are sufficient to deal with the
inconsistencies.88 Frickey believes that the traditional canons of statutory interpretation
are implemented with the goals of deferring to the public and placing a high responsibility
on the drafters (usually privately funded lobbying groups 89) WKDW DUH ³ZHOO VLWXDWHG WR
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90. Frickey, supra note 86, at 522.
91. Id. at 522±23.
92. State ex. rel. Mashburn v. Stice, 288 P.3d 247 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013).
93. Id. at 250; see also State v. Young, 989 P.2d 949 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (discussing statutory
interpretation issue regarding whether money in the Oklahoma State Insurance Fund is public); Loyoza v. State,
932 P.2d 22, 25 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (H[SODLQLQJWKHUHLV³D potential conflict between provisions in the
Delayed Sentencing Program for Young Adults (Sections 996 through 996.3 of Title 22) and the Trafficking in
Illegal Drugs Act (Sections 2±414 through 2±420 of Title 63)´).
94. Stice, 288 P.3d at 250. See City of Sand Springs v. Dep¶t of Pub. Welfare, 608 P.2d 1139, 1151 (Okla.
1980); Pickett v. Okla. Dep¶t of Human Servs., 932 P.2d 543, 545 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996); Taylor v. State, 640
P.2d 554, 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
95. Frickey, supra note 86, at 478.
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SURWHFW´WKHPVHOYHV90
Frickey institutes a three-part test for canonical interpretation of ballot measures:
first, are there constitutional doubts that may be avoided by an alternative interpretation;
second, when adopted laws are in tension with pre-existing laws, there should be a
presumption of narrow construction; and third, when a ballot initiative runs up against a
substantive canon like the rule of lenity, those canons should be applied more strongly
than they would against a legislative law.91
%HFDXVH )ULFNH\¶V PRGHO VWUHVVHV WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI LQWHUSUHWLQJ EDOORW LQLWLDWLYHV
through the local rules of statuWRU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQLWLVHVVHQWLDOWRH[DPLQH2NODKRPD¶V
common law rules of statutory interpretation. While SQ780 was a ballot initiative,
XOWLPDWHO\LWDPHQGHGVHYHUDOVWDWXWHVWKDWDUHFRUQHUVWRQHVRI2NODKRPD¶VFULPLQDOODZ
Therefore, the ballot initiative affected changes to statutes, instead of placing a new law
RQWKHERRNVOLNHPRVWEDOORWLQLWLDWLYHVDWWHPSWWRGR7KXVXVLQJ2NODKRPD¶VUXOHVRI
statutory interpretation to resolve GLVFUHSDQFLHVFDXVHGE\64LVZKDW)ULFNH\¶VPRGHO
calls for.
7KH 2NODKRPD &ULPLQDO &RXUW RI $SSHDOV UHFHQWO\ VXPPDUL]HG 2NODKRPD¶V
common law rules on statutory interpretation in State v. Stice.92 In Stice, the Cleveland
County District Attorney motioned for a writ of mandamus against a trial judge who
refused to order the defendant to pay his district attorney supervision fees. The judge
maintained it was within his discretion to assess fees and to decide who would receive the
fees. The district attorney argued that an enacted statute forced the judge to assess fees
paid directly to the GLVWULFW DWWRUQH\¶V office. In its opinion, the Stice court examines
2NODKRPD¶VFRPPRQODZKLVWRU\RIVWDWXWRU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQStice quotes extensively from
State v. Young and Loyoza v. State, which hold that statutes are to be constUXHG ³WR
determine the intent of the Legislature, reconciling provisions, rendering them consistent
DQGJLYLQJLQWHOOLJHQWHIIHFWWRHDFK´93 Stice DOVRSURYLGHVWKDW³ZKHUHDQLUUHFRQFLODEOH
conflict exists between two statutes, the latter statute controls´94 The interpreter of
conflicting statutes seems on firm ground when interpreting statutes passed into law by the
legislature. According to the Frickey model, courts can also be comfortable applying these
canons of statutory construction to state ballot initiatives.95
)ULFNH\¶VPRGHOLVDVOLJKWO\EHWWHUILWWKDQ6FKDFWHU¶VEHFDXVHWKHFDQRQVRIVWDWXWRU\
construction are clear. Frickey says that when interpreting an initiative that impacts other
areas of the law (such is the case here) then the canons of construction provide the basis
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through which to interpret. 96 The interpretation under Frickey would then be to apply
2NODKRPD¶VUXOHVRIVWDWXWRU\FRQVWUXFWLRQDVODLGRXWLQState v. Stice to the inconsistency
created between the drug court statute and SQ780.97 The Stice court states that where two
FRQIOLFWLQJVWDWXWHVFDQEHUHDGDV³QRWLUUHFRQFLODEO\FRQIOLFWLQJ´WKHQWKH\FDQFRH[LVW 98
However, if the two statutes conflict, then the statute that was enacted later controls. 99
There are then two possible inWHUSUHWDWLRQVXQGHU)ULFNH\¶VPRGHOILUVWWKHVWDWXWHVFDQ
coexist, but this would yield a much smaller number of eligible drug court participants;
second, the statutes are irreconcilable and the later statute²SQ780²controls.100 If the
first option applied, lawmakers would do nothing about the problem. If the second option
applied, it would implicitly repeal the drug court statute.
a. Policy Outcomes of Doing Nothing
Doing nothing is always an attractive option in law and policy making. 101 In many
cases, constituents are not aware of a problem with the measure they passed, and thus lawmakers can leave inconsistencies on the books that are created by ballot initiatives. Doing
nothing leaves voters free to think they made a positive difference when there are
underlying legal issues standing in the way of proper implementation. In this case, because
the statutes are not directly adverse but rather derivatively impacted, it would be simple
for lawmakers to do nothing. However, lawmakers have actively sought to limit the impact
RI64DQGQXOOLI\WKHYRWHUV¶LQWHQW 102 In 2017, the Oklahoma legislature put forward
a bill to nullify the effects of SQ780, believing that voters did not know what they were
doing when they passed the initiative. 103 This follows a large trend of legislators
attempting to reverse the will of the people in any way they can. 104 Doing nothing is

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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96. Id. at 500.
97. Id.
98. Stice, 288 P.3d at 251.
99. Id. at 249±50.
100. Id.; see Frickey, supra note 86, at 524 (an example of how to apply the model when there are conflicting
laws but both laws must coexist); id. at 517 (discussing utilizing the quasi-constitutional canons of construction
in circumstances of implicit repeal).
101. See generally Lauren French, Congress Setting New Bar for Doing Nothing, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/congress-supreme-court-budget-do-nothing-221057; Kellie Mejdrich,
Do Nothing Amendments Give Lawmakers Bragging Opportunity About Successes, ROLL CALL (July 28, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/congress-supreme-court-budget-do-nothing-221057; Susan Milligan,
The
Do-Nothing
Congress,
U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Sept.
8,
2014),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/08/the-do-nothing-congress; Darla Slipke, Oklahomans React
to Legislative Inaction, OKLAHOMAN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://newsok.com/article/5571467/oklahomans-react-tolegislative-inaction.
102. ³Republican legislators introduced Senate Bill 512, which would have amended SQ 780 to make
possession of any Schedule I and II drugs (except marijuana) a felony punishable by a fine [sic] up to
imprisonment of five years and a $5000 fine. House Bill 1482 would have expressly overruled 780¶s elimination
of sentence enhancements for repeat drug possession offenders, and effectively overruled SQ 780 for much of
the state by reclassifying possession of a controlled dangerous substance within 1000 feet of [a] school, church,
or public park as a felony. Both of these bills raised public outcry and died in committee, and at present there is
no talk of resurrecting either measure.´ Stephen Galoob, Colleen McCarty, & Ryan Gentzler, SQ780: Reform
and Resistance, 31 FED. SENT¶G REP. 182, 182 (2019) (internal footnotes omitted).
103. S.B. 512, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017); More recently, the Oklahoma Senate passed SB1674, which
makes possession of a controlled drug within 1000 feet of a school a felony again. See S.B. 1674, 57th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2020).
104. Timothy Williams, First Came a Flood of Ballot Measures from Voters. Then Politicians Pushed Back.,
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preferable to rolling back the state questions passed by voters.
The results of doing nothing are evident in the policies and practices, which have
continued for two years since the passage of SQ780. County drug courts are continuing
along; however they have experienced a large downturn in admissions since SQ780 went
into effect (See Figure 1). In 2017, Tulsa and Oklahoma counties reported stagnant or
growing admissions to drug court as compared to previous years. In 2018, the year SQ780
took effect, these large counties experienced a combined twenty-three percent downturn
in drug court admissions. 105
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Tulsa
138
151
145
153
103
145
167
162
136
County
Oklahoma 192
176
125
37
64
60
108
179
126
County
Figure 2106
7KHIHHVSDLGE\GHIHQGDQWVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQWKHSURJUDPVGULYHFRXQW\GUXJFRXUWV¶
funding.107 The fewer the participants, the smaller the budget of the drug court program.
Therefore, if the numbers continue to decrease due to the lack of eligible defendants (since
they will not have a felony drug charge), then drug court funding will eventually bottom
out. In addition, leaving the text of these two pieces of law un-reconciled leaves drug court
programs vulnerable to the whims of elected leaders who can wipe out drug courts as an
unnecessary expenditure due to the fact that there are no longer drug possession
felonies.108
b. Policy Outcomes of Implicit Repeal

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/referendum-initiative-legislaturedakota.html.
105. Admissions Data, supra note 6.
106. Id.
107. Eric Swanson, Uncertain Future for Drug Courts: State-Funded Program Could Lose Funding Due to
Budget Crisis, ADA NEWS (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.theadanews.com/news/local_news/uncertain-future-fordrug-courts-state-funded-program-could-lose/article_d4f583fd-3ac8-537e-883d-3c7ce0b5d2f6.html.
108. SQ780 eliminated felony drug possession, but Possession with Intent to Distribute and Distribution still
remain felonies. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401 (B)(1).
109. Bowers, supra note 49, at 786.
110. NAT¶L INST. OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND
DECADE 17 (Jun. 2006), https//www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/211081.pdf [hereinafter THE SECOND DECADE].
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Although it may shock many legislators and criminal justice reform advocates,
implicit repeal of county drug courts could be the first step to establishing a state-wide
proactive and therapeutic response to drug addiction in the state. County drug courts have
an extremely variable success rate across the state and are often considered stops on the
road to incarceration.109 Due to low budgets and variant training of personnel, many
county drug courts do not follow best practices in treatment of addiction or in
administering sanctions to participants.110 Further, as a result of poor administration,
county drug courts can often be a driver of incarceration instead of a remedy as they were
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intended.111 Using the money generated by the passage of SQ781, counties could create
private incentives for companies and private/public partnerships to build programs that
truly address the root causes of addiction and implement trauma-informed care.112 These
organizations could focus on prevention, education, and a holistic community response to
DGGLFWLRQ LQ ZD\V WKDW WKH FXUUHQW GUXJ FRXUWV FDQQRW 'XH WR GUXJ FRXUWV¶ VWDWXWRU\
limitations, traditional programs may only operate within the jurisdiction of the court. This
precludes them from general addiction education, addiction prevention, early intervention,
and harm reduction strategies that non-profits and free clinics can provide.113
On the other hand, without the drug court statute, courts lose the ability to sentence
defendants into alternative sentencing drug courts. Without the current framework of the
drug court statute, courts and counties would be floundering to remake the wheel of
supervised community sentencing. Many properly indicated defendants would lose the
chance at rehabilitation and the courts would again be forced to choose between
incarceration and probation.114 The defendant could tell the court they were going to
attend a private rehabilitation center, but there would be no compulsory element to their
sentence.
There is a net positive of defendants coming out of drug court who are successful. 115
Although some are revoked and sent to prison, many do succeed and go on to remain drug
free. In addition, the voters who passed SQ780 have a largely positive perception of drug
courts.116 Courts and legislators would likely face a public backlash if they used voterdriven criminal justice reforms to justify eliminating drug courts. This is true even if the
replacement were ultimately better in many ways. For these reasons, implicit repeal is
likely not the best option for reconciling SQ780 and the drug court statute. A more ideal
solution would be to tweak the current system to more closely aligQZLWKYRWHUV¶LQWHQW
This discrepancy in the laws is an opportunity to implement needed law changes to
improve the current system.

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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111. Bowers, supra note 49, at 786.
112. SQ781 authorizes Oklahoma Management and Enterprise Services (OMES) to calculate savings from
those defendants that were deferred from prison into a fund called the ³Community Safety Investment Fund.´
OMES created rules and regulations for how to apply for any money in the fund. The responsibility of creating
proposals and applying rests on DAs offices. 35 OKLA. REG. 1349 (Sept. 4, 2018). In July 2018, OMES calculated
that in the first year of implementation, SQ780 generated $63 million in savings to the state. This number was
widely criticized as flawed and overblown. The first disbursement of the fund will occur at the end of Fiscal Year
2018 by the legislature and will likely be less than the $63 Million suggested by OMES. Ryan Gentzler, The
Official SQ780 Savings Calculation Rests on Flawed Assumptions, OKLA. POL¶Y INST. (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://okpolicy.org/the-official-sq-780-savings-calculation-rests-on-flawed-assumptions/.
113. A good example of a non-profit model to address addiction is Shatterproof. The organization focuses on
public education, free resources, advocacy, and lobbying. Shatterproof¶s Task Force is dedicated to ensuring
medical best practices are aligned with addiction treatment across the country. In addition, Shatterproof provides
funding to private addiction treatment centers that follow a public health, medical science model of addiction
treatment. SHATTERPROOF, https://shatterproof.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
114. Morrissey & Brandt, supra note 9, at 772.
115. Oklahoma Drug Courts One Pager, OKLA. DEP¶T OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS.
(2016), https://ok.gov/odmhsas/documents/2017%20Dc%20One%20Pager.pdf.
116. The Oklahoman Editorial Board, Bottom Line on Oklahoma Drug Courts: They Work, OKLAHOMAN (July
23, 2018), https://newsok.com/article/5602132/bottom-line-on-oklahoma-drug-courts-they-work.
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D. Applying the Gilbert Model of Ballot Initiative Interpretation 117
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117. See generally Gilbert, supra note 67.
118. Nicholas
Capaldi,
Majoritarianism,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITTANICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/majoritarianism (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
119. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1634.
120. Id. at 1639.
121. Id. at 1623.
122. *DPH7KHRU\DQGWKHPHGLDQYRWHUWKHRUHPRULJLQDWHGLQ+DUROG+RWHOOLQJ¶VKLVWRULFSLHFH6WDELOLW\LQ
Competition. Examining the multitudinous ways this article has shaped society is outside the scope of this article.
See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929).

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 99 Side B

Michael D. Gilbert is a law professor at the University of Virginia School of Law
focusing on election law, legislation, and constitutional entrenchment. The Gilbert Model
is the most modern model of ballot initiative interpretation examined in this Comment.
Gilbert relies heavily on the ideal of the median voter. Unlike Schacter and Frickey, Gilbert
HPEUDFHVWKHLGHDRI³PDMRULWDULDQLVP´²the concept that a majority of the population has
the right to make decisions that affect society.118 While Schacter and Frickey seek to limit
the power of the majority, Gilbert embraces it. He states that the median voter is most
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI WKH ³&RQGRUFHW ZLQQHU[,] . . . the proposal that would defeat all other
proposals in a head-to-KHDGYRWHXQGHUDV\VWHPRIPDMRULW\UXOH´119
In support of this work, Gilbert argues that, many times, a product of legislative
democracy is bargain democracy²a kind of tit-for-tat voting that trades policy-making
objectives among legislators. In bargain democracy, the citizens lose something because
they are not getting to choose between one policy or the other, they are getting watered
GRZQODZVWKDWDUHWKHSURGXFWRIOHJLVODWRUVWUDGLQJYRWHVZLWKHDFKRWKHU LH³,I\RX
YRWH IRU P\ ELOO , ZLOO YRWH IRU \RXUV´  +H DVVHUWV WKDW WKLV FDQ OHDG WR OHVV GLUHFW
representation and a lack of action from legislators. In contrast, when voters get a chance
to choose what they want, the majority rules, and there can be no question of whether the
ballot initiative they voted for is the Condorcet winner. Because elected judges answer to
the same electoUDWHZKHQWKRVHMXGJHVDFWLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHEDOORWLQLWLDWLYH¶VLQWHQW
they are acting legalistically even though they may be criticized for pandering to their voter
base.
In DOLJQPHQW ZLWK WKH ³&RQGRUFHW ZLQQHU´ FRQFHSW *LOEHUW DUJXHV WKDW ZKHQ
discerning voter intent, courts must only ask one question²³among plausible
interpretations, which one would the voters who voted on the initiative have preferred to
DOO RWKHUV"´120 However, Gilbert also states that considering the median voter means
taking into account the voters that opposed the measure and their intentions. 121 In this
way, Gilbert advocates for some restriction on the interpretation of ballot measures, though
not as strongly as Schacter and Frickey.
*LOEHUW¶VWKHRU\RIEDOORWLQLWLDWLYHLQWHUpretation yields a much different result than
WKH SUHFHGLQJ WZR WKHRULHV %HFDXVH *LOEHUW¶V PRGHO VHHNV WR HPEUDFH WKH ZLOO RI WKH
PDMRULW\ LQ D PXFK GLIIHUHQW ZD\ WKDQ 6FKDFWHU DQG )ULFNH\ DSSO\LQJ *LOEHUW¶V PRGHO
requires a deeper understanding of the median voter theorem. The median voter theorem
is an economic theory that has led to many modern political prediction tools and other
prominent theories in our society, such as Game Theory. 122 The basic principle in the
median voter theorem is that a majoritarian system will reflect the most preferred will of
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the median voter²the voter with the most moderate understanding of the ballot measure
as it was written.123
Using SQ780 and SQ781 as an example will help to explain the median voter theory.
These initiatives were passed during the 2016 presidential election. Fifty eight percent of
voters passed the initiatives. The text of the ballot initiative read:
This measure amends statutes to reform criminal sentences for certain property and drug
offenses. It makes certain property offenses misdemeanors. It makes simple drug possession
a misdemeanor. Property offenses where the value of the property is one thousand dollars or
more remain felonies, and the distribution, possession with intent to distribute, transportation
with intent to distribute, manufacture, or trafficking of drugs remain felonies.124
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123. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1645.
124. SQ780, supra note 3.
125. This hypo is a variant of the example in Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1647.
126. Official Results: Federal, State, Legislative and Judicial Races General Election – November 8, 2016,
OKLA. ELECTION BD. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ok.gov/elections/support/20161108_seb.html.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Straight ticket voting allows voters to fill in ³Republican,´ ³Democrat,´ or ³Independent´ once at the top
of their ballot, and that selection will carry throughout the ballot. Since State Questions and Referendums are
answered on a ³Yes/No´ basis, straight ticket voting does not apply to those parts of the ballot, and voters must
make a manual selection for each of the questions, usually at the end of the ballot. Straight Ticket Voting,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Straight-ticket_voting (last visisted Dec. 1 2018).
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Keeping the text of the measure in mind, assume there were five voters that voted on
SQ780. Assume all five of them are concerned about excessive state government spending
and over-incarceration. Voter A felt the measure did not go far enough, and that more
property crimes and more drug crimes should be declassified, but still voted yes. Voter B
believed that the measure was too conservative and that more property crimes should be
declassified, but agreed with the drug crime declassification, so voted yes. Voter C agreed
with the measure as written, and so voted yes. Voter D found the measure too liberal,
believing that possessing drugs should be a misdemeanor but that the property crimes
should not be declassified, so voted no. Voter E voted no because she believed the measure
was too liberal and that the property crimes and drug crimes should stay as they are. In this
example, Voter C is the median voter who reflects the will of the majority. 125 Using
*LOEHUW¶VPRGHOFRXUWVDQGOHgislators should interpret SQ780 to reflect the intentions of
Voter C.
Understanding the intentions of Voter C is extremely cultural and fact dependent.
Discerning the intentions of Voter C requires a deeper understanding of the election
landscape in Oklahoma in 2016. SQ780 was passed by fifty-eight percent of the voting
block during the November 2016 general election. 126 Oklahoma is traditionally a very
Republican state: The state voted 65.32% for Donald Trump, and 67.74% for James
Lankford, Republican Senate candidate.127 Only eleven democratic candidates for State
House were elected out of seventy-three State House districts.128 This is indicative of a
high number of voters utilizing straight party voting, which allows voters to check one
box²Democrat or Republican²DQGWKDWSDUW\¶VFDQGLGDWHZLOOEHPDUNHGIRUWKHZKROH
ballot. Straight party voting is not applicable to State Questions, so voters must
LQGHSHQGHQWO\FKRRVH ³\HV´RU³QR´ PDQXDOO\ 129 Thus, straight party voting cannot be
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130. State Question No. 776, Initiative Petition No. 367 (as proposed by Okla. Sec¶y of State, Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/776.pdf.
131. Ryan Gentzler, SQ780 Should Save Oklahoma Millions Next Year, OKLA. POL¶Y INST., (June 14, 2017),
https://okpolicy.org/sq-780-save-oklahoma-millions-next-year/.
132. Oklahomans have the highest rate of non-medical pain pill use in the nation at 8.1%, twice the national
average. OKLA. DEP¶T OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS., STATE OF ADDICTION: A SERIES OF
STORIES FROM THE OKLAHOMAN, TULSA WORLD, OKLAHOMA WATCH, STATE IMPACT OKLAHOMA, OETA
KWTV-9, AND KGOU 4 (2010), http://www.odmhsas.org/stateofaddictionc%20(2).pdf.
133. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1650.
134. Strong Bi-Partisan Support for Ambitious Criminal Justice Reforms in Oklahoma, FWD.US (Nov. 4,
2018), https://www.fwd.us/news/ok-poll-memo/.
135. Gilbert, supra note 67, at 1621.
136. ³[Assistant District Attorney for Tulsa County, Erik] Grayless said now the only people eligible for felony
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used to explain the passage of any state question. During the same election, voters
approved a legislative referendum, State Question 776, which allowed the legislature to
designate any method of execution and reaffirmed that the death penalty is not cruel and
unusual punishment.130 With such a strong conservative base, the passage of SQ780 was
unexpected. The most likely explanation is the cost savings and government spending
reduction likely to come out of the implementation of SQ780,131 as well as the number of
every day Oklahomans that battle with or are touched by addiction.132 All of these factors
VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGZKHQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHPHGLDQYRWHU¶VLQWHQW
Gilbert also discusses the importance of considering opinion polls when determining
WKHPHGLDQYRWHU¶VLQWHQW+HFRQFHGHVLWis not a perfect measure because some who are
polled do not vote, but that polls can be a helpful tool for reflecting the true majority
RSLQLRQLQWRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ³[p]oll respondents may be more representative of society than
the subset of voters who voted on the initiative, and pollsters could . . . frame issues more
FOHDUO\WKDQLQLWLDWLYHVSRQVRUV´133 In the case of SQ780 and SQ781, some opinion polls
have been conducted regarding criminal justice reforms in Oklahoma as recently as 2018.
A November 4, 2018 poll showed that seventy-two percent of Oklahomans believed that
2NODKRPD¶V FULPLQDO MXVWLFH V\VWHP QHHGHG ³VLJQLILFDQW LPSURYHPHQWV´ )LIW\-four
percent of republicans and seventy-five percent of democrats believed it was very
important to reduce the number of people in prisons and jails.134 Using poll information
WRLQIRUPLQWHUSUHWDWLRQPD\GRPRUHWRVHUYHWKHPDMRULW\WKDQ6FKDFWHU¶VRU)ULFNH\¶V
models because where Schacter and Frickey seek to limit the power of the majority, Gilbert
seeks to embrace it.135 7KHUHIRUH WKH XOWLPDWH FRQFOXVLRQ RI WKH YRWHUV¶ LQWHQW XVLQJ
*LOEHUW¶VPRGHOLVWRLPSOHPHQWWKHODZVLQDZD\WKDWZLOOUHGXFHLQFDUFHUDWLRQ7KLVZLOO
require legislators to amend the current drug court statute to ensure that it complements
SQ780 in a way that reduces incarceration and provides meaningful and effective
treatment for addict populations.
The current administration of the drug court statute allows district attorneys sole
discretion to admit defendants who have eligible felonies. Several types of felonies are
considered admissible to drug courts such as receipt of stolen property, false personation,
grand larceny, possession with intent to distribute, along with several more. The
controlling charge does not have to be drug related in order for a district attorney to offer
a defendant drug court. However, one managing Tulsa County district attorney has
questioned whether GHIHQGDQWVZKRFRPPLWWKRVHW\SHVRIFULPHV³GHVHUYH´GUXJFRXUW136
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRUG COURT STATUTE
Intellectually, interpreting the inconsistency created by SQ780 seems manageable.
However, when put into practice, each of the interpretations would lead to vastly different
policy outcomes that could have negative impacts across the state. Doing nothing and
allowing the statutes to remain as they are could bottom out drug court funding due to the
continuing downturn in eligible defendants. Implicitly repealing the drug court statute may
be attractive to those who would like to start over with a more preventative and holistic
approach to treating addicts in the system. However, in reality it would potentially end a
program that is the most successful alternative thus far in treating addicts in the system.137
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drug courts are those arrested for more serious nonviolent crimes like intent to sell drugs or felony burglary. µIs
that the sort of person who deserves drug court?¶ Grayless asked.´ Chandler, supra note 52.
137. THE SECOND DECADE, supra note 110, at iii (³Research indicates that drug courts can reduce recidivism
and promote other positive outcomes. However, research has not uncovered which court processes affect which
RXWFRPHVDQGIRUZKDWW\SHVRIRIIHQGHUV7KHPDJQLWXGHRIDFRXUW¶VLPSDFWPD\GHSHQGXSRQKRZFRQVLVWHQWO\
court resources match the needs of offendHUVLQWKHGUXJFRXUWSURJUDP´ .
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Historically, district attorneys preferred to admit defendants with felony possession
charges to drug court. However, SQ780 removed that option. If district attorneys continue
to restrict drug court admissions to first-time felons with low-level drug-related crimes,
then drug court will become unsustainable because those felonies no longer exist. The
YRWHUV¶LQWHQWLQSDVVLQJ64LVDWRGGVZLWKWKHFXUUHQW district attorney framework for
admitting defendants to drug court²ZKHUH 64 VHHNV WR H[SDQG DGGLFWV¶ DFFHVV WR
treatment and reduce the number of addicts in prison, district attorneys seek to limit access
to drug court on moral grounds.
7KH DERYH DQDO\VLV FRQFOXGHV WKDW XQGHU *LOEHUW¶V PRGHO RI LQWHUSUHWLQJ EDOORW
LQLWLDWLYHVWKHYRWHU¶VLQWHQWLQSDVVLQJ64ZDVWRUHGXFHSULVRQRYHUFURZGLQJreduce
government spending on incarceration, and provide a more compassionate response to
addiction-driven crime. The prospect of doing nothing and allowing the drug court statute
to remain in conflict with the changes created by SQ780 runs counter to those intentions
EHFDXVHLWVKULQNVWKHSRRORIWKRVHHOLJLEOHIRUGUXJFRXUWWKHVWDWH¶VRQO\FRXUW-mandated
drug treatment program, thus taking away one vehicle for delivering a compassionate
response to addiction. In addition, doing nothing does not meaningfully reduce the prison
population or prison spending because some defendants in drug court still go to prison,
and drug court has existed for eighteen years without creating a meaningful reduction in
the prison population. Allowing SQ780 to implicitly repeal the drug court statute could
allow practitioners and experts to create a whole new infrastructure for how the Oklahoma
criminal justice system handles addiction, however this is an unlikely interpretation
because lawmakers and courts would inflame the public by using SQ780 as a justification
for eliminating drug courts.
7KHEHVWSDWKIRUZDUGLVXVLQJ*LOEHUW¶VPRGHOWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHYRWHUV¶LQWHQWDQG
WKHQXVLQJWKHJRDOVDUWLFXODWHGE\WKHYRWHUV¶LQWHQWWRDPHQGWKHGUXJFRXUWVWDWXWH7KLV
begs the question: what amendments to the drug court statute would reduce government
spending on incarceration, reduce prison overcrowding, and provide a compassionate
response to addiction based crimes?
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In addition, the funds from SQ781 intended to provide preventative community drug
treatment are being funneled through district attorneys offices. Therefore, implicit repeal
would leave the state with no infrastructure, no funds, and a treatment fund with no river
to flow into.138 Amending the drug court statute to reflect the intent of the voters is the
most realistic and beneficial interpretation.
A. Remove District Attorney as Gatekeeper
There are several ways to amend the drug court statute to create a policy landscape
more in tune with the voWHUV¶LQWHQWEHKLQG647KHILUVWDQGPRVWLPSDFWIXOZRXOGEH
to remove district attorneys as drug court gatekeepers and place that responsibility with
the court. The drug court statute currently mandates that district attorneys are the sole body
that can recommend an offender for drug court. 139
Evidence for this recommendation can be found in two privately-funded court
alternatives run in Tulsa County: Women in Recovery and First Step Male Diversion
Program. Both of these privately-funded, non-profit programs require the judge to make
the ultimate decision on whether or not the offender gets sentenced into the program. 140
The district attorney still maintains control of the charge and can make recommendations
as to whether or not the judge should admit the defendant to the program, but ultimately
the court decides who is admitted.141 This takes the admission control from the district
attorneys, who historically shy away from alternative courts for offenders that do not fit a
typical addict profile, and yet still suffer from addictions that are the root of their crimes.142
Women in Recovery participants often have a more diverse criminal history than those
traditionally put into drug court, and have a higher success rate.143 Officials at the program
pinpoint this success to a close working relationship with the judges who recommend
defendants for admittance. In addition, the Women in Recovery program closely monitors
the ORAS scores144 (the diagnostic assessment used to gauge criminality and likelihood
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138. 35 OKLA. REG. 1349 (Sept. 4, 2018).
139. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2 (B) (2014).
140. Women in Recovery participants can enter a blind plea. After the plea is entered, the judge sentences the
participant to Women in Recovery as an alternative sentencing program. Tracy LeGrand, Women in Recovery
Supported, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.tulsaworld.com/archive/women-in-recoverysupported/article_e1fde645-41dd-5394-a476-5ca67a5af130.html.
141. Id.
142. A typical drug court defendant has crimes that solely reflect addiction: Possession of a Controlled Drug,
being the most popular drug court crime. Since possession is now a misdemeanor in Oklahoma, this is no longer
available and District Attorneys must look to other crimes that are indicative of addiction. Some of those could
include: possession with intent to distribute, burglary, false personation, child endangerment, unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle, etc. The inquiry should always be fact dependent. District attorneys have expressed chagrin
at these types of defendants receiving the chance at drug court. Chandler, supra note 52.
143. Stetson Payne, Women in Recovery Celebrates 25th Graduating Class to Help Break Cycle of Addiction
for Families, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 9, 2018) https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/women-in-recoverycelebrates-th-graduating-class-to-help-break/article_611f05c9-7e09-5e61-91e4-5eeb388e5840.html.
144. The Ohio Risk Assessment System is an empirically researched and validated tool for discerning criminal
risk factors. The tool ³was developed to classify the risk level of offenders in the system while also identifying
both criminogenic needs and barriers to programming.´ EDWARD LATESSA ET AL., CREATION AND VALIDATION
OHIO
RISK
ASSESSMENT
SYSTEM
FINAL
REPORT
6
(July
2009),
OF
THE
https://www.ocjs.ohio.gov/ORAS_FinalReport.pdf. The ORAS tool is widely used in criminal justice systems
across America to assess needs and risks of criminal defendants or inmates who may be reentering society
through community sentencing, parole or bail. Id. at 2.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 102 Side A

05/15/2020 10:30:18

MCCARTY, C - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/6/2020 4:11 PM

WHEN VOTERS’ INTENT BACKFIRES

557

B. Remove the Prior Violent Felony Restriction and the Current Violent Felony
Restriction
7KH FXUUHQW GUXJ FRXUW VWDWXWH SURYLGHV WKDW ³WKH RIIHQGHU KDV QR SULRU IHORQ\
conviction in this state or another state for a violent offense within the last ten (10)
\HDUV´147 and also states that the current crime the defendant is being charged with must
be non-YLROHQW +RZHYHU 2NODKRPD¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI D YLROHQW IHORQ\ LV EURDG 8QGHU
current law, the twenty-two eighty-five percent crimes are labeled as violent.148
Additionally, anyone to whom conspiracy liability attaches can also be charged with a
violent felony. This means that an accomplice who sits in the getaway car of a robbery
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145. Chandler, supra note 52.
146. Adult Drug Court, OKLA. DEP¶T OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS.,
https://ok.gov/odmhsas/Substance_Abuse/Oklahoma_Drug_and_Mental_Health_Courts/Adult_Drug_Court/ind
ex.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
147. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2(2) (2014).
148. See sources cited supra note 40.
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of recidivism) of its participants and only admits those who have a high chance of success.
District attorneys can take the ORAS scores into account when determining sentencing,
but more often district attorneys use the type of crime to make decisions about alternative
sentences. Often, defendants with ORAS scores that indicate they could be successful in
drug court are not offered the chance to enter drug court²even when the statute would
allow it²because their crimes are deemed too serious to be allowed the chance at
rehabilitation outside of prison.145
While this solution may increase the workload on the judiciary, especially in small
counties with few judges, the workload would not increase by a large amount. Currently
judges must still adjudicate defendants in drug court, however they have no say in who is
accepted or rejected into the programs. Giving the gatekeeping function to the judge would
allow the judge to do a fact-EDVHGDQDO\VLVDQGGHFLGHWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWDWXVDWWKHWLPHRI
adjudication. There is a concern that in small counties where judges and district attorneys
work closely together that the judge would simply follow all the same recommendations
that the district attorneys make as far as which defendants get the chance at drug court.
However, the largest impact would occur in the most populous counties²Tulsa County
and Oklahoma County²where judges and district attorneys frequently disagree and there
is less trepidation about a negative impact to their working relationships.
Removing the district attorneys as gatekeepers to drug court is aligned with the
YRWHUV¶ LQWHQW EHFDXVH LI WKH QXPEHUV IURP WKH DERYH-mentioned private programs
maintain, more defendants will be approved for drug court if the judge is in control of
admissions. This would reflect the YRWHUV¶ LQWHQW LQ WKUHH ZD\V ILUVW LW ZRXOG UHGXFH
incarceration because the judge is more likely to follow the ORAS score recommendation.
Second, removing the district attorney as gatekeeper allows the system to deliver
compassionate addiction treatment to those defendants who would otherwise go directly
into the prison system. Third, it reduces government spending on incarceration and
adjudication because an individual costs the state $5,000 per year in drug court as opposed
to $19,000 per year in prison.146
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149. Sarah Shannon, et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in the
United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 22±23 (Sept. 2017); see also Alan Flurry, Study Estimates U.S.
Population with Felony Convictions, UGA TODAY (Oct. 1 2017), https://news.uga.edu/total-us-population-withfelony-convictions/.
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.2(A)(2).
151. Priscilla Hunt, The Price of Justice: New National and State Level Estimates of the Judicial and Legal
Costs of Crime to Taxpayers, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 231, 234 tbl.1 (2017).
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will be charged with a violent felony if the robbery is attempted or completed with a
weapon. Many defendants are charged with violent felonies yet present no violent
tendencies. It is these complexities in Oklahoma law that make sentencing and restrictions
on rehabilitative treatment extremely punitive.
Allowing the court to be the gatekeeper of drug court, in addition to adding a neutral
body to the process, will also allow judges to perform a balancing test in regard to prior
DQGFXUUHQW³YLROHQW´IHORQLHV when deciding whether or not they should preclude drug
court admission. This balancing test should consider what type of crime the defendant is
held on, whether or not the defendant has a violent history, a history of mental health
issues, DQG DOVR ZKHWKHU WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V DGGLFWLRQ FDXVHG WKH EHKDYLRU WKDW OHG WR WKH
felony charge. If the defendant is indeed exhibiting violent outbursts, has a history of
harming others, and his/her ORAS score does not indicate the defendant will be successful
in drug court, then the court should take the steps to refuse drug court admission. However,
allowing this analytical step to be taken by the court is an important first step to ensure
Oklahoma is not excluding candidates from drug court who would benefit from and
succeed in an alternative sentencing drug court.
There are other sociological problems with the prior felony restriction. A recent
study by a University of Georgia sociologist found that while eight percent of the overall
United States population has a prior felony conviction, thirty-three percent of African
American males have a felony conviction.149 This disproportionality impacts any system
that limits access based on prior felony convictions. The Oklahoma drug court statute
limits admission to those individuals who have no prior violent felony convictions in the
past ten years.150 This restriction enables district attorneys to limit access to treatment to
first time drug offenders. However, this limitation creates flawed results. Those defendants
with one or several prior felony convictions could have ORAS scores that indicate they
would be successful in drug court. In addition, their underlying addiction could be a root
cause of the behavior that led to their prior convictions. Rehabilitating the addiction can
UHGXFHRUHOLPLQDWHDGHIHQGDQW¶VLQWHUIDFHZLWKWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHP
Nationally, states spend $200 to $600 per adjudication of a robbery defendant, and
$200 to $800 per adjudication of a larceny defendant. 151 The cost to the state taxpayer
increases exponentially when a defendant is sentenced to prison. Therefore, multitudinous
resources are spent on those defendants who have multiple felony convictions. Allowing
a prior felon access to an alternative sentencing drug court would racially equalize drug
court participants as well as reduce state spending on adjudication and incarceration.
District attorneys employ a retributivist view of drug court that is largely based on
moral concerns. They fear that those defendants who have multiple felony convictions are
too far gone for rehabilitation. The logic is that those defendants went to prison, which
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was meant to rehabilitate them, and the rehabilitation was ineffective. 152 However,
research shows that prison is ineffective for rehabilitation and frequently causes an
increase in criminality when defendants are released.153 Thus, individual defendants
should not be blamed for the ineffectiveness of prison as a rehabilitative intervention and
thus precluded from treatment options.
Eliminating the prior felon restriction from the drug court statute is consistent with
YRWHUV¶LQWHQWEHFDXVHmore defendants of greater diversity will be approved for drug court
if the prior felon/current violent felon restrictions are removed. This would reflect the
YRWHUV¶ LQWHQW LQ WKUHH ZD\V ILUVW LW ZRXOG UHGXFH LQFDUFHUDWLRQ EHFDXVH PRUH SURSHUO\
indicated defendants entering drug court means less prison admissions, thus less prison
spending. Second, removing the prior violent felon/current violent felon restriction allows
a more racially compassionate system. Equal access to state drug rehabilitation programs
indicates that all Oklahoma citizens are being offered equal protection of the laws and not
suffering from systemic discrimination. Third, allowing prior felons a chance to participate
LQGUXJFRXUWZLOOWDNHWKH³IUHTXHQWIOLHUV´LQWKHFULPLQDOMXVWice system and allow them
a chance at true rehabilitation. Even if this theory only partially bears out (i.e. some
defendants still fail and return to prison) the spending reduction on rehabilitating those
who revisit the criminal justice system frequently would still create a net reduction in
government spending.
C. The Drug Court Statute Should Provide That a Defendant Cannot Be Revoked Solely
Due to Drug Relapse
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152. Scholars have long endorsed the concept that prosecutors can bring charges as long as they personally,
morally believe the defendant is guilty. There is no reason not to infer this same personal belief transfers to
allocation of alternative sentencing pleas. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's
Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 524 (1993); see also Sarah French Russell,
Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1146 (2010).
153. Serge Brochu et al., Comparative Profiles of Addicted Adult Populations in Rehabilitation and
Correctional Services, 16 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 173, 173 (1999).
154. In the 2017 mid-term primaries, Oklahomans passed SQ788, which made medical Marijuana legal in the
state. This is interesting, because prior to the passage of SQ780 (just a year previous), possession of Marijuana
could have led to a decade long prison sentence if the defendant had prior drug crimes. Paul Armentano, Public
Support for Medical Marijuana Access Is Overwhelming and Bipartisan, HILL (June 30, 2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/394915-public-support-for-medical-marijuana-access-is-overwhelmingand-bipartisan; OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 2-402 (B)(3)±(4) (2016); State Question No. 788, Initiative Petition No.
412 (as proposed by Okla. Sec¶y of State, Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/788.pdf.
155. Nora Volkow et al., Drug Use Disorders: Impact of a Public Health Rather than a Criminal Justice
Approach, 16 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 213, 213 (2017).
156. Bruce Goldman, Neuroscience of Need: Understanding the Addicted Mind, 29 STANFORD MED. MAG.,
no. 1, 2012, at 24.
157. Editorial Board, If Addiction Is a Disease, Why Is Relapsing a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018),
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Public and scientific opinion surrounding addiction has changed vastly in the last
twenty years.154 The concept of addiction and addiction treatment is considered in
America widely as a public health issue rather than one that should be handled in the
courts.155 Addiction, also called Substance Use Disorder, is a disease that impacts the
brain in predictable and pathological ways.156 The criminal justice system has been widely
criticized for not implementing scientific advances into the way it treats drug addiction. 157
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The National Association of Drug Court Professionals provides a list of best
practices that all drug courts are encouraged to follow. 158 One of the most impactful and
progressive practices provides that defendants should not be revoked from a drug court
sentence due to a drug relapse.159 Recent addiction and human behavior research suggests
that relapse is a statistical inevitability when treating addict populations. 160 Though
different drugs have different time periods for predicted relapse²some of which include
months or years²the fact is that relapse is an expected and surmountable challenge
inherent in addiction treatment.
Under current county drug court rules and regulations, many programs permit
revocation of a drug court sentence after a defendant gives a drug-positive result on a
urinalysis test.161 This practice is widely variant across counties. Some drug courts may
have a zero-tolerance policy for drug use while others may allow a few failed drug tests
before revoking the sentence. A revocation means the defendant goes to prison to serve a
sentence they agreed on with the judge should they fail drug court. Thus, revocations drive
prison population growth. Having revocation policies that are inconsistent with the science
of addiction is essentially ensuring that defendants will fail the programs and go to prison.
Legislators, judges, and district attorneys must ensure that the drug court programs
are administered with the most up-to-date medical knowledge of addiction and the best
practices for ensuring success. Certainly, there will still be drug court failures. However,
those failures will not be predicated on a predictable outcome such as relapse. Ignoring
relapse as a part of recovery is setting defendants up to fail, thus driving high incarceration
rates. Encoding the inability to revoke sentences due to relapse into the drug court statute
will ensure uniform practice across the state.
V.

CONCLUSION
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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/opinion/addiction-relapse-prosecutions.html.
158. ³Drug Courts have significantly poorer outcomes and are considerably less cost-effective when they
terminate participants for drug or alcohol use.´ 1 NAT¶L ASSOC. OF DRUG COURT PROF¶LS, supra note 35, at 33.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 46.
161. FINIGAN, CAREY & COX, supra note 12, at 62.
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This Comment argues that there is an irreparable inconsistency in the Oklahoma
drug court statute created by SQ780, a ballot initiative passed by voters in 2016. The ballot
initiative declassified drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor. The drug court
statute requires a felony for admission. This inconsistency has created a vacuum of drug
FRXUWSDUWLFLSDQWVDQGWKUHDWHQVWREDQNUXSW2NODKRPD¶VDOWHUQDWLYHVHQWHQFLQJGUXJFRXUW
programs, which depend on high levels of participation for funding. After examining three
models of ballot initiative interpretation, this &RPPHQWGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKHYRWHUV¶LQWHQW
in passing SQ780 was to reduce prison populations, reduce government spending on
prisons, and create a compassionate way of treating addicts in the criminal justice system.
The best way to achieve these ends is to amend the drug court statute in the following
ways: remove district attorneys as gatekeepers to drug court admissions and substitute the
court, remove the prior felony/current violent felon restrictions and employ a balancing
test for violent felonies so that a violent felony does not preclude entry into drug court,
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and provide in the statute that defendants cannot have their drug court sentences revoked
due to addiction-related UHODSVH7KHVHVWDWXWRU\FKDQJHVZLOOVROLGLI\WKHYRWHU¶VLQWHQWLQ
passing SQ780. Amending the drug court statute in these ways will remedy the
inconsistency in the statutes and create a net reduction in the Oklahoma prison population
ZKLOHLQWURGXFLQJFRPSDVVLRQDQGFRPPRQVHQVHWR2NODKRPD¶VWUHDWPHQWRIDGGLFWVLQ
the criminal justice system.
- Colleen McCarty*
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